2015.02.20 NEWS ARTICLES

PacNet #10 – Terrorism, old grudges, and Japan’s renewed position in the world

Lully Miura wrote an article on PacNet (Pacific Forum Web-Site) about “Terrorism, old grudges, and Japan’s renewed position in the world.”

The hostage situation where ISIL terrorists held two Japanese nationals ended in a predictable and tragic outcome. Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto’s lives were threatened at gunpoint by the terrorists, initially for a ransom of $200 million, and later for a hostage exchange with a convicted terrorist in Jordan. The Japanese government repeatedly said it was against negotiating with terrorists while obviously coordinating with the Jordanian and other Middle Eastern governments for the hostages’ release. Later, however, footage of the two’s beheadings were uploaded online.
This is not Japan’s first encounter with terrorism. Japan struggled against extreme communist groups calling itself the “Japan Red Army” during the 70’s, and against religious extremism during the 90’s. It has also experienced its fair share of terrorism in the Middle East from abductions to attacks against Japanese businesses. However, the impact of the latest hostage situation seemed more sensational driven by the cruelty and provocative propaganda that accompanied the killings itself.
Shockwaves of the atrocity swept across the nation. There seemed to be unanimous condemnation towards the terrorists by the government, opposition leaders, and the media. However, the left quickly started questioning the administration’s handling of the situation and where its motives lied. Concerns about the hostage situation quickly became concerns about how the tragedy may change Japan. A sad reminder that old time grudges between the left and right still stir distrust even in the face of innocent lives at stake.
The Abe administration has maintained solid support of the public. Snap elections in late 2014 gave a two thirds majority to the LDP-New Komei coalition in the lower house. This strength mainly reflects the administrations’ efforts and partial success to combat deflation and a sluggish economy. It is no secret that the Prime Minister has ambitions to use this renewed mandate in foreign policy. Opposition leaders and the liberal leaning media have strongly criticized the administration on this point.
Japan has an unfortunate cold war legacy when it comes to discussing security related issues. The conservatives, including PM Abe and the current administration, seek a larger role for Japan reflecting its economic presence as well as heightened tensions in the region. This renewed role is modest by any Western standard, but it isn’t seen that way by most of the administrations’ liberal opponents. Japan’s liberals are basically against any deviation from Japan’s pacifism policy embodied in its constitution.
The debate over Japan’s position in the world and its security implications are more symbolic than anything. In reality, the majority of conservatives are committed to continue Japan’s path as a pacifist nation, and most liberals don’t seek to abolish Japan’s standing military. Of course, it has been proven that fighting over symbols can be a risky business filled with emotions.
The administration’s liberal opponents accused the administration of being at fault for sending incendiary messages to the terrorists. They accused the administration for vising the Middle East and especially Israel while knowing that the two hostages were held captive. The PM’s speech, delivered in Cairo, which laid out Japan’s commitment of $200 million to assisting countries facing ISIL’s threat became the focus of this accusation. The argument was that despite Japan’s humanitarian focus, the terrorist may have “misunderstood” Japan’s intentions. The administration quickly dismissed these accusations and reaffirmed its commitment to stand against terrorist, and ISIL in particular.
This is all déjà vu to those who have followed Japan’s past security debates. Whether in hostage situations, UN peace keeping, or how to support the US’s military campaigns, the focus of Japan’s debate becomes less about the issue at hand, and more about how Japan’s pacifism identity should be interpreted. One could say, in this case as well, that this was happening all over again. Others believe that this time could be different. If one looks beyond the superficial display of cold war sentiments, there are signs of real change. I believe that this change is a product of both domestic politics and bureaucratic reforms that have took place in the last few years.
There is a growing realization among the Japanese public that an overly liberal interpretation of the world is perhaps naive in this day and age. The rise of China is no longer a distant trend talked about in economic circles. Many Japanese were shocked at images of the Chinese vessel hurling itself against the Japanese Coast Guard in 2012. Security concerns have shifted the electorate to the right, questioning the long held belief that if Japan does no harm then no harm will come to Japan.
This shift in the electorate is magnified by the structural change in Japanese party politics. During the 3 years in power from 2009 to 2012, the now opposition center-left Democratic Party of Japan, or DPJ, took a reasonably realistic stance in foreign policy. Although there was rhetoric of a more liberal positioning including a new interpretation to the US-Japan alliance, the DPJ could not deliver. One could say that relationships with neighboring countries, especially Korea, worsened during DPJ’s time in power. This suggested that the liberal foreign policy platform believed possible since the cold war days, was never a real option in the first place.
After the Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP, returned to power in late 2012, the coalition it leads has won back to back landslide victories. The DPJ now holds less than a third of seats compared to the LDP, and there seems to be a fundamental debate of what the party should now stand for. Also, there is now a new phenomenon of smaller parties to the right of the LDP. Among these parties, The Japan Innovation Party, more commonly known as “Ishin” is the most important. Ishin asserts itself with a reformist economic agenda and overhaul of Japan’s centralized government structure. Although they have little to no experience in foreign policy, their sentiment seems to be close to the LDP if not further to the right. All this suggests stronger support to the administrations more realistic foreign policy.
The second change is the impact of bureaucratic reforms aiming to strengthen the Prime Minister’s leadership in foreign policy. Traditionally, the Japanese Prime Minister’s leadership was restricted by legal and conventional norms. Many of these restrictions were taken away during the late 90’s and early 2000’s to speed up decision making and combat much needed reform. The effect of these reforms became relevant in domestic economic policy during the Koizumi administration. PM Koizumi leveraged this new power to push through reform against the objection from vested interests that mainly came from within the LDP.
Since taking office for the second time in 2012, PM Abe has been eager to expand this trend to foreign and security policy, enabling a more presidential style leadership. He established Japan’s National Security Council and appointed seasoned diplomats, and defense experts to directly support him. Decision making once held across the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense are now more concentrated at the PM’s office.
PM Abe has used his strengthened leadership to put forth an ambitious foreign policy he calls “proactive contribution to peace”. He has been proactive to visit more countries than any of the past Prime Ministers. Many of these visits to Africa, South America, South Asia, and the Middle East were to countries that have historically been low on Japan’s priority list. The main message the Prime Minister stressed was that Japan is back. After more than a decade of economic contraction and cutting back on foreign assistance, Japan was now willing to take a more proactive position to the issues concerning the world.
The change is not only about presence but about substance as well. Japan’s foreign policy was once almost entirely dependent on its ability to provide economic development assistance. This strategy came naturally reflecting Japan’s rise as an economic giant in the Post War world, and the restrictions it held itself to in security issues. This is starting to change as well. From the spread of terrorism, gender inequality, to the fight against Ebola, Japan is now more directly focused on global threats to long term peace and prosperity. It has also lifted restrictions to assist countries in providing a means to help defend itself, most notably against maritime disputes that spread across Asia.
The motives behind this new stance is mixed. There is the obvious motivation to sincerely contribute to a liberal world order and enhance Japan’s position. There is also a domestic agenda to provide a new way of thinking about Pacifism that isn’t unrealistic or naive.
The hostage situation perhaps demonstrated that a larger role for Japan does not come without risk. It also inevitably ignited old grudges over how to think about Japan’s role in the world. The administration seems ready and willing to take a new direction. It should follow up with a vision that its citizens and the world are better served with the new Japan.