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Japanese Values Today 2019

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RESEARCH
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Yamaneko Research Institute Inc.

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ABOUT THE PROJECT:

“Japanese Values Today” is a research project by Yamaneko Research Institute Inc. started in 2019.

This research aims to focus on voter’s underlying values and beliefs that would drive voter’s decisions. In 2019 Japanese upper house election, we witnessed some phenomenon that Japan shares with other advanced democracies. There was clear sign of the emergence of economic populism in the left, which was driven by the awareness of unequal wealth distribution and low growth while the world continues to enjoy the economic and social progress geared by globalization. But at the same time, Japan is thought to be uniquely stable democracy. Why Japan enjoys such stability? Does she have no dynamism in the society?

This research is the first attempt that thoroughly try to approach not only the policy preferences but also people’s values and beliefs in Japan. The purpose of this research is not to find consensus or divide the public according to their beliefs, but to help understanding Japanese society more clearly and also constructively contribute to the discussions over how voter’s view affects the election and make democracy works better.

“Japanese Values Today” survey was conducted in partnership with the survey firm Macromill. The survey interviewed 2060 people in Japan in August 2019.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

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Executive Summary

The Yamaneko Research Institute, Inc. conducted a survey of 2060 men and women over the age of 18 using an Internet panel. The survey covered various values related to security, the Constitution, economic policy, social policy and women's issues. It also included general values and opinions such as nationalism, anti-establishment sentiment, and distrust towards media. The survey aimed to identify the population's preferences and ideologies and the link to people's morals and values.

Key Findings

- In the 2017 House of Representatives election and the 2019 House of Councillors election, ideologies related to national security and the Constitution had the greatest influence on voting behavior.
- The economic policy divide, or value gap in Japanese society has only secondary importance in elections. Social values do not have much effect on voter's behavior.
- Unlike conservative parties in other advanced democracies, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) does not represent any class or economic status.
- Distrust of the existing elite is strong among voters in general, and elements of this distrust have a negative impact on the LDP.
- There is a bipartisan consensus on the values of the Japanese people on many issues such as perceptions towards China and South Korea, free trade, privatization, acceptance of foreigners, women's issues, and LGBT issues.
- There is a gap between media coverage of structural reform “fatigue” and the reality of public opinion.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won the 2019 upper house election as it did in the last four national elections. The largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) strongly advocated for social liberalism during its campaign, but as the survey shows, it could not effectively mobilize socially liberal voters. The survey data also suggests that people's voting behavior in the 2019 upper house election was not motivated by economic or social values.

The reason is because more important factors affect people's voting. Attitudes towards the Constitution and the Japan-U.S. alliance affect the voting behavior most, those two issues divide the public and serve as an important factor in choosing which political party they vote for.

On the whole, Japanese people feel that they face a severe security threat in East Asia, therefore are positive about the current Japan-U.S. alliance, and majority of the respondents support realistic security policy. It is difficult to see the possibility of reconciliation in history issues with South Korea, when overwhelming majority of respondents do not seek such compromise. When it comes to diplomacy and national security, it turns out that the policy preferences are converging on many issues except those related to Constitution and the alliance.

The division of economic values over growth and redistribution in Japan is only of a secondary importance compared with the Constitution and the alliance. In Japan, the wealth gap is relatively moderate and there are fewer visible billionaires. The survey suggests that it seems difficult to obtain enthusiastic support from liberals for the additional expenditure for the poor. Japanese public opinion is greatly influenced by the values of the middle class. Respondents overall have moderate economic values and less aware of fiscal discipline. Free trade, high stock prices, and privatization are welcomed regardless of party affiliation. The fact that the idea of privatization is welcomed across various political segments cast doubts about the media's report of fatigue from structural reform that began under the Koizumi Administration in the early 2000s.

In terms of social policy, the values of the average Japanese are moderate and somewhat liberal. Except for nuclear power policy, many social values tended to converge and do not form along party lines. The value gap in social values is more generational. Social issues have not served the opposition to drive up support. At present, it is difficult to assume that there is a clear liberal orientation among opposition supporters.

With regard to women's issues, many respondents were aware of where the problem is, and although they directionally agree with social and institutional reform, the results indicated that about half of the people have reservations over certain sexual harassment accusation, since it tends to cause "bigger trouble." In sum, the Japanese

public at large have liberal values in women's issues, but some skepticism remains to treat women "favorably."

Anti-establishment sentiment was widely observed regardless of party affiliation. 81.4% of the respondents think that elites never understand "people like me." The reason of stability of Japanese politics seems to be that anti-elite sentiments are not galvanized under one populist party or leader. However, relatively speaking, distrust towards elite institution such as the government, Diet, bureaucracy, and media disproportionately affect the LDP in elections. The unique phenomenon in the 2019 Upper House election was that Reiwa-Shinsen-gumi (Reiwa) got two seats in proportional representation against the forecast of the mainstream media. Albeit at a small scale, economic populism movement emerged in Japanese politics, and the overwhelming majority of respondents who said they casted their votes in Reiwa was strongly anti-establishment and had negative view towards the state of this country.

However, majority of respondents (74.0%) including Reiwa supporters value self-help before seeking public aid, and there is no momentum to promote an extremely large government.

The stability of Japanese politics is based on the conclusion that even if supporters of ruling parties do not approve of the current state of politics, they have no choice but to support the LDP, based on the policy values of security and economic growth.

An outcome of the survey "Japanese Values Today 2019" shows a balanced distribution in both economic and social values. Japanese constituencies are not as skewed as those in the United States (which was seen in a 2016 Voter Study Group's survey by democracy fund), Japan has enough social liberals both on the economic left and right. However, due to the intense conflict of values regarding the Constitution and the alliance, it is difficult for the political parties to package and mobilize the combination of certain economic and social values.

When the leading opponents change their positions in the debate over the Constitution and national security, there is a possibility that a change of government will take place and take root. With the introduction of the single-seat constituency system for the House of Representatives election from 1996, the role and presence of political parties have increased. Thus, it is possible that party ideology and values stand

out more in future elections. External factors or pressures might have a role in it, for example, the current discussion over the amendment to Article 9, change in US credibility, or China exercising more military power in the East China Sea.

In summary, the biggest factor that ruling LDP gains stable support is security realism. Core supporters of the LDP include an amalgam of corporations, small business owners and farmers, and specific interest groups, but looking at the majority of voters who casted their votes to the LDP, it is clear that it does not represent any class or economic segment. When the Japanese society overcome the political divide in the Constitution and the alliance, the ruling party will likely lose dominant support. That may be why conservative political parties in Japan are beginning to approach socially liberal agenda such as women's issues and child abuse. And partly due to the administration's effort to focus on women's economic independence, liberal values in women's issues are supported more widely regardless of age.

It is important to closely watch the change that is undergoing in Japanese society which is also coping with globalization and low growth like other advanced democracies. This survey is the first attempt to thoroughly research values of Japanese citizens, and we continue to research more.

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Methodology

“Japanese Values Today 2019” survey was conducted by the survey firm Macromill. In total, 2060 respondents (over 18) with internet access took the online survey questions about their values between August 30 to 31 in 2019. In order to ensure accurate age segment analysis, 2,060 respondents were arranged by age group. We collected 206 samples for 18 and 19 years old nationwide, and 309 each samples for the 20's, 30's, 40's, 50's, 60's, and 70's and above segments nationwide, and weighted by the ratio of each age group as of 2018.

The respondents were asked about their profiles such as age, gender, occupation, income, education, and residential area (prefecture). Although the data could not escape from the bias by the respondent's internet literacy, the Macromill panel samples are less biased than the other online samples; the survey data shows regional distribution was approximately in proportion to the actual population density. Voter turnout tended to be higher than it really was. In the survey, 61.8% of respondents said they had voted while the actual turnout was 48.8%. Although, the other methodology taken in online survey tends to have wider gap in turnout, because during yearly research, the researchers tend to "intervene" the respondents in the process of screening and by asking the political questions over and over again, thus making those respondents become politically aware and motivated. In order to capture the actual image of Japanese voters who have less party affiliation than other democracies, the survey should include wide variety of people, not just politically motivated people.

In our survey, there was no serious deviation from voting behavior for the Upper House election in 2019. The below numbers are the percentage of votes each party got from the respondents who clarified which party they vote for proportional representation (which means excluding respondents those who did not vote (18.5%), did not remember (5.9%), or did not want to clarify which party they vote for (18.2%)). The following number in the brackets shows the actual percentages each party got in 2019 election.

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) gained 36.2% (35.37%)

Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) gained 18.7% (15.81%)

Komeito gained 5.7% (13.05%)

Japan Innovation Party (Ishin) gained 14.8% (9.80%)

Japanese Communist Party (JCP) gained 7.8% (8.95%)

National Democratic Party (NDP) gained 2.6% (6.95%)

Reiwa Shinsengumi (Reiwa) gained 5.8% (4.55%)

Social Democratic Party (SDP) gained 1.4% (2.09%)

The Party to Protect the People from NHK (N-koku) gained 3.8% (1.97%)

In most of online surveys Komeito tends to be underrepresented and Ishin tends to be overrepresented. Because Komeito is religious party, the respondents usually do not openly tell their party affiliation. Ishin is a unique party with strength in Kansai area, it has affinity to the people who has internet literacy. The party leader of N-koku is popular you-tuber, so it seems that N-koku has affinity to internet users as well. But those are relatively minor issues.

The data analysis contains segment analysis and correlation analysis. The most important segment is party affiliation, but analysis includes age, income, house income, educational segments. In the United States, where there is a stronger sense of party affiliation, segment analyses are typically conducted by asking respondents which political party they support, but in Japan, where the majority of voters identify as ‘unaffiliated,’ a looser definition of political party support is needed. To do this, we utilized two indicators. The first is political party performance rating, which is segmented into four levels, and the second is actual observed voting behavior. If people do not tell lies about their voting behavior, “actions speak louder than words,” so these can be classified as true feelings. This method has a weak point, however. Because elections are not held frequently, it is difficult to demonstrate a gradation when comparing the levels of political party performance rating. This is why both indicators are used.

If you are media or an academic institution and would like to use the data, please contact our website (yamaneko.co.jp).

Survey Outcomes

3-1 Values Pertaining Foreign Affairs, Security, and the Constitution

To survey respondents about their values pertaining to foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution, we asked them to choose the response corresponding to their degree of agreement/disagreement for the following 10 statements.

- (1) We should further strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.
- (2) The government should increase defense spending in the near future.
- (3) I think China has territorial ambitions.
- (4) Japan should seek to possess nuclear weapons in the future.
- (5) Japan should not compromise with South Korea on history issues.
- (6) I am in favor of the Constitutional revision plan that stipulates the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), while maintaining Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9.
- (7) I agree with the 2015 security law reform which enabled partially exercise the right to collective self-defense.
- (8) The Self-Defense Forces should be actively used to contribute to international society.
- (9) The government should enhance surveillance to strengthen counterterrorism measures.
- (10) Japan should conclude alliances with like-minded countries such as UK, Australia.

The statement that garnered the strongest average positive response from all respondents was ‘(3) I think China harbors territorial ambitions,’ followed by ‘(5) Japan should not compromise with South Korea on historical issues,’ with 79.7% and 75.8% of respondents answering ‘agree’ or “strongly agree,” respectively. The statement that garnered the weakest average positive response was ‘(4) Japan should seek to possess nuclear weapons in the future,’ followed by ‘(2) Japan should increase its defense budget going forward,’ with 15.1% and 37.6% of all respondents answering ‘agree’ or “strongly agree,” respectively.

Overall, 44.5% of respondents agreed with Prime Minister Abe's proposed revisions to the Constitution (Question (6)), while 36.9% were opposed. Looking at questions that deal with the Japanese perspective on security, which appears to be changing in recent years, respectively, 48.7%, 58.2%, and 69.7% of respondents agreed with Questions (8) (international use of the Self-Defense Forces), (10) (allying with Great Britain and Australia), and (9) (enhancing surveillance for counterterrorism

purposes). The support for strengthening counterterrorism measures shows that, even among Japanese people who tend to be cautious about exercising public power, support for government surveillance is increasing provided it is for safety reasons. With the rise of the information society, there has been an increasing number of cases of privacy infringement by private-sector actors, so the Japanese people may be moving toward accepting the cost of surveillance. The fact that allying with Great Britain and Australia garnered support from more than half of all respondents might reflect trends in the diversification and internationalization of security cooperation, but another factor that must be considered is the increasing sense of China as a threat, which has already been mentioned.

As for the questions about the Japan-U.S. Alliance, 49.6% of respondents agreed with strengthening the alliance (Question (1)) and 45.1% supported the military legislation passed in 2015 (Question (7)). Although more respondents agreed with strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance than those who opposed it, it did not garner as much support as the conclusion of a new alliance with Great Britain and Australia, which suggests that respondents are aware of the costs associated with the base issue and the risk of entanglement. However, only 6.8% of respondents chose 'strongly disagree' in response to the question about strengthening the alliance. It indicates that the most people who chose negative answer to the question do not necessarily oppose the alliance itself, but seek to maintain the status quo.

In sum, the Japanese people's assessment of the current Japan-U.S. Alliance is positive as a whole, because they sense a threat in their security environment. In terms of historical issues with South Korea, judging from public emotions, there does not appear to be any momentum that will soon lead to a diplomatic solution.

Next, we quantified the indicators of values pertaining to foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution for all respondents. Excluding '(10) Japan should conclude alliances with countries that share its values like Great Britain and Australia,' where it would be difficult to interpret the realism and liberalism in terms of conventional values, we quantified the responses to the remaining nine questions and averaged them. We assigned two points to 'strongly agree' as the maximum realist position, one point for 'agree,' zero points for the neutral 'neither agree nor disagree / I don't know,' -1 point for 'disagree,' and -2 points for 'strongly disagree' as the maximum liberal position. The average score for all respondents was 0.23 out of 2.0

(age-corrected). In other words, the average for all respondents can be defined as slightly realist (\approx conservative).

With regard to foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution, the highest degree of conservatism was found in 50-59 year old age group (the average score for this age group was 0.36), followed by 70 years old and above, 60-69 year-olds, 30-39 year-olds, 20-29 year-olds, and 18-19 year-olds. The older people tend to have unwavering values and ideology concerning foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution, and those issues are important to them. On the other hand, young people in general tend to choose ambiguous responses in all cases throughout this survey, and they have not yet developed fixed values especially on foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution.

Generally speaking, those who were born in 1960s, now in their 50s, grew up after the whole society disillusioned with the leftist student movement in 1960s. They are either “Non-political generation” (i.e., not left wing, born in 1950-64) or “Bubble generation” (born in 1964-75) who enjoyed the fruits of Japan’s rapid economic growth. In every political survey, this generation shows conservative tendencies than other generations such as “Burnt generation” (those who spent their childhood during or shortly after WWII, now 74-85 year old) or the Baby Boomer generation (student movement generation, now 71-73 year old). The following figure shows the normal distribution by age for these value scores.




Figure 1 Values pertaining to foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution: Normal distribution by age

The next analysis is the segment analysis by party affiliation. We divided respondents into four groups starting with those who gave a very high performance rating to the Liberal Democratic Party and ending with those who gave them a very low performance rating (i.e., very high performance rating group, high performance rating group, low performance rating group, and very low performance rating group) and looked at the differences in each group’s values for the topics of foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution (see Figure 2). For each of the 10 questions, Figure 2 shows the average scores for each of the four segments and the degree of difference between them. The highest point value of two (2) represents the highest degree of conservatism, while the lowest point value of -2 represents the highest degree of liberalism.



Figure 2 Values by party affiliation: foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution

What stands out the most is that the biggest value gap between the segments is found on the issues of revising Article 9, collective self-defense, and the need to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. Despite the categorization of issues under the broad umbrella of foreign affairs and security, it appears that the values of the Japanese people are converging rather than dividing along partisan lines for many of the questions. A convergence of opinion beyond party affiliation is evident for maintaining a sense of vigilance against China, objecting to Japan possessing nuclear weapons, feeling that Japan should not concede to South Korea on history issues, the demand for strengthening counterterrorism measures, and exploring alliances with UK and Australia.

To this day, four years after the passage of security law reform in 2015, people remain highly divided over the approval of the exercising the right of collective self-defense. As more time passes, however, it is possible that this division will grow smaller. Japan once experienced fierce partisan dispute over whether the Self-Defense Forces should participate in peacekeeping operations in early 1990s. Compared to that time, as these results show, the partisan divide over whether to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces overseas is relaxing. The partisan divide on controversial topics that are

still fresh in the mind is wide, but the measures in question appear to become firmly established after the passage of a certain amount of time.

Quintessentially, the partisan divide on foreign affairs and security issues revolves around the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Constitution, and it could be said that the controversy over concrete measures to achieve international peace and Japan's security is secondary.

3-2 Values Pertaining to Economic Policy

To survey respondents about their values pertaining to economic policy, we asked them to choose the response corresponding to their degree of agreement/disagreement for the following 10 statements.

- (1) Economic growth is important even if it generates some disparity.
- (2) I agree with the decision to raise the consumption tax to 10%.
- (3) Japan should further reduce the number of public works projects.
- (4) Rising stock prices are a good thing.
- (5) Things that the private sector can do should be left to the private sector.
- (6) Japan should not raise the tax rate on high income earners any further.
- (7) If Japan plans to expand human services any further, it should raise taxes.
- (8) The corporate tax should not be raised any higher.
- (9) I approve of free trade.
- (10) No more budget should be spent on poverty programs such as 'livelihood protection.'

The statement that garnered the strongest average positive response from all respondents was '(5) Things that the private sector can do should be left to the private sector,' followed by '(9) I approve of free trade' and '(4) Rising stock prices are a good thing,' with 74.6%, 64.4%, and 63.8% of respondents answering 'strongly agree' or 'agree,' respectively. What is interesting is the extent to which 'Things that the private sector can do should be left to the private sector', a catch phrase that has been used since the Koizumi administration's Japan Post reforms, has permeated Japanese society. Although free trade has been deemed problematic in terms of negotiations on agricultural protections, the principle garners wide support, and the percentage of people who oppose rising stock prices is low. (Respondents who chose 'strongly disagree' for these questions were 3.3% and 3.4%, respectively.)

The statement that garnered the weakest average positive response was '(6) Japan should not raise the tax rate on high income earners any further,' followed by '(8) The corporate tax should not be raised any higher' and '(2) I agree with the decision to raise the consumption tax to 10%.' Respectively, only 17.9%, 25.9%, and 27.8% of respondents agreed with these statements. This suggests that, overall, respondents support taxes that they feel do not impact them and oppose those that do. Especially strong opposition was voiced regarding '(6) Japan should not raise the tax rate on high income earners any further,' with 39.6% of respondents choosing 'strongly disagree.'

There tends to be a big divergence in opinion on values related to economic policy regarding the topic of growth versus redistribution, followed by the topic of fiscal discipline. Taking a look at those statements that are symbolic of these topics, 47.3% of respondents agreed and 40.0% disagreed with ‘(1) Economic growth is important even if it generates some disparity,’ which pertains to the topic of growth versus redistribution. As this shows, the respondents were clearly split on this issue. Next, we defined ‘(7) If Japan plans to expand human services (public services such as pensions, welfare, health insurances, and child care services) any further, it should raise taxes’ as symbolic of values pertaining to fiscal discipline. Here, we also observed a split among respondents, with 38.8% agreeing with and 49.2% opposing this statement, but overall, opposition to fiscal discipline was stronger. The next issue that is thought to divide public opinions is protection for the vulnerable. This is symbolized by the statement ‘(10) No more budget should be spent on poverty programs such as livelihood protection,’ and again we see a split among those in agreement with (39.9%) and opposing (45.8%) this issue (livelihood protection is public assistance to provide minimum means of existence). Finally, let us look at public works, an issue that is a target for criticism against wasteful spending that garners a great deal of press. 37.1% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘(3) Japan should further reduce the number of public works projects,’ while 46.3% opposed it.

To summarize, the Japanese people in general tend to support privatization, free trade, and high stock prices, but their awareness of fiscal discipline is low. We can infer that one of the main reasons many people strongly support raising taxes on the wealthy is because income growth for the middle classes in developed countries has slowed to a crawl while income for higher classes continues to grow amid globalization which is a phenomenon commonly seen in developed countries. Moreover, income for the emerging middle class in rising economies such as China and Southeast Asia grows dynamically. Thus, Japanese middle class feels left behind, wants to raise taxes for the wealthy, but additional measures to fight poverty do not easily garner ardent support, because they do not think they are the potential beneficiary of such system. The wealth distribution in Japan is comparatively equal than many other developed countries in the first place. According to 2019 Global Wealth Report by Credit Swiss, Japanese adults who live with less than 10,000USD wealth is limited to 4.6%. Also, Japan GINI index was 0.3721 after income redistribution in 2017. Public opinion in Japan is greatly influenced by the values of middle class.

Next, we quantified the indicators of values pertaining to economic policy for all respondents. The issue of consumption tax (value added tax) cannot be easily addressed here because it can garner opposition in both realist and liberal contexts, so we calculated average scores for the remaining nine questions. We assigned two points to ‘strongly agree’ as the maximum realist position, one point for ‘agree,’ zero points for the neutral ‘neither agree nor disagree / I don't know,’ -1 point for ‘disagree,’ and -2 points for ‘strongly disagree’ as the maximum liberal position. The average score for all respondents was 0.028 out of 2.0.

At an extremely low 0.054, the highest degree of realism with regard to economic policy was found in the 20-29 year old age group, followed by 50-59 year-olds, 60-69 year-olds, 30-39 year-olds, 70 year-olds and above, 40–49 year-olds, and 18–19 year-olds. As mentioned in the previous section, young people in general tend to choose ambiguous responses in all cases because they have not yet developed fixed values. The following figure shows the normal distribution by age for these value scores. Overall, more people hold moderate values pertaining to economic policy than those who hold moderate values pertaining to foreign affairs and security.




Figure 3 Values pertaining to economic policy: Normal distribution by age

As with foreign affairs and security issues, the segment analysis by party affiliation is important. We divided respondents into four groups according to their

rating for the LDP and looked at the differences in each group's values pertaining to economic policy (see Figure 4). As expected, the topic where the biggest value divergence was observed between the segments was the issue of growth versus redistribution. The average scores for each of the segments are shown below. Here as well, the highest point value of two (2) represents the highest degree of conservatism (economic realism), while the lowest point value of -2 represents the highest degree of liberalism (economic populism). Respondent values were found to be extremely convergent in most of the questions. There were almost no differences by party affiliation in the degree of agreement with issues like free trade and privatization.




Figure 4 Values by party affiliation: Economic policy

Although a clear partisan divide is evident for the consumption tax hike, which was a major campaign agenda during the 2019 election, even the degree of agreement in the group that gave high performance ratings to the LDP was low. People's opinion towards politicized issues like this could possibly shift in two to three years. Therefore, the statements where a clear partisan value divide was demonstrated and is likely to continue were numbers (1) (growth versus redistribution) and (7) fiscal discipline. Regarding fiscal discipline, however, the degree of agreement in the group that gave

high performance ratings to the LDP was low, and there is a clear lack of polarization like that observed in the responses to questions about security and the Constitution.

To summarize, the polarization of opinions on Japan's economic policy is limited to the disagreement over the symbolic topic of “growth versus redistribution.” But economic value divide is of secondary importance in Japanese politics, and one could even claim that opinions on economic policy appear to converge toward the center. Although this kind of convergence has been noted in advanced nations across the board, it seems that, compared to countries where conflicts of class and race come into play on the issue of redistribution, this convergence is typical of Japan where people are more likely to skew to the middle.

3-3 Values Pertaining to Social Policy

To survey respondents about their values pertaining to social policy, we asked them to choose the response corresponding to their degree of agreement/disagreement for the following 10 statements.

- (1) I oppose allowing husbands and wives to have different surnames.
- (2) Homosexuals should not be given special treatment.
- (3) More importance should be placed on Japan's traditional events.
- (4) Nuclear power plants should be maintained for the time being.
- (5) The government should not expand acceptance of foreign workers.
- (6) I do not want foreign tourists to be increased anymore.
- (7) I oppose adopting a quota on the percentage of female Diet members.
- (8) Some corporal punishment as a form of parental discipline is unavoidable.
- (9) The overconcentration of resources in Tokyo should be corrected even if it means using the national budget.
- (10) University tuition should not be made completely free.

The statement that garnered the strongest average positive response from all respondents was '(3) More importance should be placed on Japan's traditional events,' followed by '(2) Homosexuals should not be given special treatment,' and '(10) University tuition should not be made completely free,' with 77.8% , 62.0%, and 58.2% of respondents answering 'strongly agree' or 'agree,' respectively. Because the term "special treatment" with regard to homosexuals is ambiguous, we do not know to what extent this could indicate discrimination, but if taken at face value, public opinion seems to underpin the lack of progress in introducing special systems and support measures at schools for LGBTQ children. There are likely many reasons for opposing free university tuition, but only 11.7% of respondents were strongly in favor with making universities free, so in the very least, it seems unlikely that a strong political movement like the one in the United States will develop to advance this issue.

The statement that garnered the weakest average positive response to the questions was '(1) I oppose allowing husbands and wives to have different surnames,' followed by '(6) I do not want foreign tourists to be increased anymore' and '(7) I oppose adopting a quota on the percentage of female Diet members.' Respectively, only 26.0%, 26.7%, and 27.2% of respondents agreed with these socially conservative statements. In the party leaders' debate ahead of the 2019 House of Councillors

election, the endorsement of law reforms to allow husbands and wives to have different surnames by every party except the LDP remains fresh in the mind, but this survey revealed that only 9.7% of respondents indicated strong opposition to the issue of different surnames. Furthermore, attitudes tolerating corporal punishment by parents are waning. Only 6.9% of respondents indicated strong agreement with allowing parents to use corporal punishment to discipline their children. In terms of empowering women, only 6.7% of respondents indicated strong opposition to using quotas to ensure a certain proportion of female Diet members. This survey contains other questions that deal with issues pertaining to women, and these are covered in the next section.

Interestingly, many respondents agreed with expanding the intake of foreigners, with 54.7% supporting the expanded intake of foreign workers and 63.3% supporting the expanded intake of foreign tourists. This is partly due to the economic growth strategy introduced by the conservative government. Abe administration (LDP) recently passed the law reforms to largely expand the acceptance of foreign workers to help economic sectors which suffer chronic labor shortages. The administration also actively promoted increasing inbound campaign to cope with the declining domestic demand. It came to be understood that accepting more foreigners is good for the economy.

In Japan, over-centralization that leads to regional divide is an important social/economic issue. Tokyo is the center of the economy, politics, and culture at the same time, where over 13 million people out of 126 million lives. Greater Tokyo area holds over 36 million people. Half of the listed companies, about 60% of the corporations capitalized at 1 billion yen or more are located in Tokyo. Such wealth/population gap between Tokyo and the outlying regions legitimized redistribution policy to allocate 16 trillion yen to local governments each year. But it is sometimes pointed out that the distribution of tax money may hinder competition among local governments. The question about whether the overconcentration of resources in Tokyo should be corrected even if it requires the use the national budget implies the abovementioned debate. With 56.5% of respondents supporting distribution to remedy overconcentration, the survey shows that awareness of the issue of regional decline remains keen.

Another divisive social/economic issue is nuclear power plants. After the great earthquakes on March 11, 2011, Japanese public is divided over whether Japan should keep nuclear reactors. Rather than attempting to gauge agreement or disagreement with

new construction of nuclear power plants, we used a moderate question to ask if nuclear power should be maintained, and as expected, the level of support was not very fervent, with only 8.6% of respondents choosing ‘strongly agree’ and 29.8% choosing ‘agree.’ Meanwhile, 48.6% of respondents disagreed with this statement.

Next, we quantified the indicators of values pertaining to social policy for all respondents. To limit our analysis to social values, we calculated average values for seven questions, omitting the questions on nuclear power, correcting the overconcentration of resources in Tokyo, and free university tuition. We did this because nuclear power and free university tuition are issues that exist between the realms of economic and social policy and because it is hard to define the gradation between conservatism and progressive viewpoints on the issue of correcting the overconcentration of resources in Tokyo. The average score for all respondents was a nearly neutral but slightly liberal -0.099 out of 2.0.

At 0.024, the highest degree of conservatism with regard to social policy was found in the 50–59 year old age group. Meanwhile, at -0.34, the highest degree of liberalism was found in the 18–19 year old age group, followed by -0.30 for the 20–29 year old age group, -0.17 for the 30–39 year old age group, -0.13 for the 40–49 year old age group, -0.061 for the 60–69 year old age group, and -0.016 the 70 and above age group. One can see those in their 50s are the most conservative generation in both security and social policies.

The following figure shows the normal distribution by age for these value scores. In particular, young people account for most of the liberal respondents, and the progression by age group is more clearly pronounced for values pertaining to social policy than for values pertaining to foreign affairs and security and values pertaining to economic policy.




Figure 5 : Value pertaining to social policy: Normal distribution by age

To ascertain the extent of partisan divide on values pertaining to social policy, we conducted the same type of segment analysis that we did for foreign affairs and security and economic policy. We divided respondents into four groups according to a respondent's rating of the LDP, and looked at the differences in each group's values pertaining to social policy (see Figure 6).

At a glance, the only social policy where there is a clear difference by segment is nuclear power. Almost no differences exist between the segments on the issues of special treatment for homosexuals, the need to place more importance on traditional events, and expanding the intake of foreign workers and tourists. Slight differences can be seen on the issues of allowing different surnames for husbands and wives, the gender quota for Diet members, and the use of corporal punishment by parents, but none of these can be considered value gaps, and the degree of conservatism among the high performance rating group is not very high. In most of the questions, a convergence of respondents' values can be observed.




Figure 6 Values by party affiliation: Social policy

To summarize, aside from the issue of nuclear power, there is no partisan divide on values pertaining to social issues in Japan, and liberal leanings in the segment that gave very low performance rating to the LDP are not very strong for social policy. We cannot claim that there is liberal opposition to the ruling party on the issues of free university tuition, the use of corporal punishment, gender quotas for Diet members, and special treatment for homosexuals. The only issue where the degree of liberalism clocked in below the -1 threshold was nuclear power, which suggests that the other issues could not effectively serve to unify the opposition parties. However, there is a notable generation gap pertaining to social values, so we expect voters' policy positions to shift gradually going forward.

3-4 Values Pertaining to Women's Issues

To survey respondents about their values pertaining to women's issues, we asked them to respond to the following 6 statements. This group of questions was the only one patterned on the VOTER Survey conducted in the United States, and the first question was adjusted to be natural, easy to understand in Japanese.

- (1) Women are better suited to housework.
- (2) When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors.
- (3) Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.
- (4) Women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve.
- (5) Sexual harassment against women in the workplace is no longer a problem in Japan.
- (6) Increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in Japan.

This was the only section where the questions mixed conservative and liberal value statements. The reason for doing this was to present a range of socially formed values and make it easier to illustrate the results by asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement. Therefore, the following analysis must be evaluated with caution because the questions were a mix of strongly conservative and strongly liberal statements.

Firstly, 30.7% of respondents agreed with the statement '(1) Women are better suited to housework,' while 54.2% indicated disagreement; however, only 3.3% chose 'strongly agree.' Regarding the statement '(2) When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors,' 34.2% of respondents agreed while 53.9% disagreed. Meanwhile, 64.2% of respondents agreed with the statement '(3) Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.' while 28.3% indicated disagreement. As for '(4) Women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve,' 43.2% of respondents agreed while 41.7% disagreed. One notable outcome is that only 5.1% of respondents agreed with the statement '(5) Sexual harassment against women in the workplace is no longer a problem in Japan.' On the other hand, a whopping 89.5% of respondents indicated disagreement with this statement. Finally, 54.4% of respondents agreed with the statement '(6) Increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in Japan,' despite this being an unfamiliar concept in the Japanese context. Meanwhile, 31.7% of respondents expressed opposition to this sentiment.

The following figure, which shows the normal distribution by age for the value scores pertaining to women’s issues, reveals that there is almost no difference in the distribution by age group and that the majority of respondents hold liberal-leaning values. However, the elderly age groups should also include a large number of a respondents who were alive before the ‘Act of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment’ was passed. Considering that more women have entered the workforce over the years, it is possible that this shift has led to a change in the values of older generations, and in turn, pushed the overall sentiment in the liberal direction. If that is the case, then one might be able to take the position that the issue of women’s rights has permeated the normative discourse.




Figure 7 Values pertaining to women’s issues: Normal distribution by age

So, are women’s issues becoming politicized? Looking at Figure 8, one can see that almost no value differences exist along partisan lines. Particularly, all respondents recognize that the problem of sexual harassment still persists. However, the responses to all other questions lean ever so slightly in the liberal direction, but we cannot claim that especially progressive values have permeated society.

Ultimately, people recognize that women’s issues exist, and they agree on the overall direction of reforms, namely, promoting women's advancement in society and striving for a world without gender discrimination; however, the results indicate that some people feel that making sexual harassment accusations causes a commotion, and some skepticism exists regarding measures to support women and provide them with preferential treatment. So what exactly does this mean?




Figure 8 Values by party affiliation: Women’s Issues

Earlier, we observed that views on social policy do not clearly skew along party lines, and likewise, women’s issues do not lend themselves to partisan divide. In Japan, while there is a clear axis that divides the ruling and opposition parties on issues of security and the economy, there is no clear demarcation of party positions on social policy and women’s issues; therefore, discrimination against women remains among progressive voters, while some conservative voters are willing to support liberal reforms pertaining to social policy and women's issues. Because the LDP’s support base in a broad sense does not harbor discrimination against women, at least in terms of gradual reforms, women’s issues could become a policy topic for the ruling party.

3-5 Other Values

To survey respondents about their values pertaining to other policies, we asked them to choose the response corresponding to their degree of agreement/disagreement for the following 10 statements.

- (1) I think Japan today is heading in the right direction.
- (2) Japan is a country respected by the world.
- (3) Japan is a fair society where everyone who makes an effort can be rewarded.
- (4) Elites in this country, including bureaucrats and politicians, do not understand the feeling of the people like me.
- (5) You can't believe much of what you hear from the mainstream media.
- (6) Our economy system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Japanese and large corporations.
- (7) Elections today don't matter; things stay the same no matter who we vote in.
- (8) Reforms are necessary even if they result in short-term destabilization.
- (9) Japan needs strong leaders to break up vested interests.
- (10) Generally speaking, it is important to try to help yourself before relying on government programs.

Questions (1) through (3) aim to measure the intensity of positivity about the current situation and self-affirmation. Questions (4) through (7) aim to measure anti-establishment sentiment and pessimism about the current situation. Questions (8) and (9) aim to measure expectations for reforms and change, while Question (10) aims to assess values pertaining to personal responsibility, a trait that has firm roots in Japanese society.

Only 22.7% of respondents agreed with the statement '(1) I think Japan today is heading in the right direction,' while 61.1% indicated disagreement. When we asked respondents if they thought '(2) Japan is a country respected by the world,' 38.2% responded positively, but 48.0% responded negatively. As for the statement '(3) Japan is a fair society where everyone who makes an effort can be rewarded,' 42.0% responded positively, but 48.5% responded negatively. This lack of positivity about the current situation runs contrary to Japan's external expression of stability.

Meanwhile, in terms of anti-establishment sentiment, a whopping 81.4% of respondents agreed that '(4) Elites in this country, including bureaucrats and politicians, do not understand the feeling of the people like me,' while only 12.2% disagreed with

this statement. The criticism represented by the statement ‘(5) You can’t believe much of what you hear from the mainstream media’ can be seen as one indicator of anti-establishment sentiment commonly observed around the world, and 67.5% of respondents agreed with this statement. Meanwhile, only 22.5% of respondents said the media could be trusted. Furthermore, 79.2% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘(6) Our economy system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Japanese and large corporations,’ while only 13.7% disagreed. Regarding the statement ‘(7) Elections today don’t matter; things stay the same no matter who we vote in,’ 56.4% of respondents agreed while 38.2% disagreed. This reveals that distrust in the elite and the feeling that the current system is rigged in favor of vested interests and the elite, that is, anti-establishment rhetoric and sentiment typically observed in other advanced democracies, also exists in Japan. However, do people truly want change given Japan’s stable political environment?

To gauge this, we presented respondents with the following two statements: ‘(8) Reforms are necessary even if they result in short-term destabilization,’ and ‘(9) Japan needs strong leaders to break up vested interests’ and found that 60.2% and 60.3% of respondents agreed with these statements, respectively, while 26.2% and 26.4% disagreed. This means that a majority of Japanese have expectations for reforms to break through the current system and hopes for the emergence of a strongman. We will come back to the explanation that analyses why there is no upwelling of these sentiments in Japanese elections.

Finally, with regard to the statement ‘(10) Generally speaking, it is important to try to help yourself before relying on government programs,” 74.0% of respondents indicated agreement, while 16.6% opposed this idea.

Looking at values by age group (c.f., Appendices 1 and 2), a slightly higher percentage of younger people chose ‘strongly disagree’ in response to ‘(1) I think Japan is heading in the right direction lately,’ and young people tended to disagree with the statement ‘(3) Japanese society rewards those who make an effort’ as well. The degree of agreement with ‘(6) Our economy system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Japanese and large corporations’ increased with the age of the respondents, which shows that younger people have more balanced opinions that are closer to the factual perceptions.

With regard to ‘(7) Elections today don’t matter; things stay the same no matter who we vote in’ as well, younger people tend to agree with this sentiment more than older people. This was the only question where a very small percentage of young people chose ‘Neither agree nor disagree / I don’t know,’ which reveals a distinct position on this matter.

Interestingly, the older the respondent, the more likely they were to agree with ‘(8) Reforms are necessary even if they result in short-term destabilization’ and ‘(9) Japan needs strong leaders to break up vested interests’ while younger respondents tended to be non-committal. However, with regard to ‘(10) Generally speaking, it is important to try to help yourself before relying on government programs,’ the older the respondent the more likely they were to agree, so much so that there was a 30-point difference between the 18–19 year old age group and the 70 years and above age group. This indicates that the elder respondents who wants to destabilize current politics do not necessarily want a big government.

The significance in these general value statements lies with how they correlate to trust in political parties and voting behavior, so as we did with values pertaining to foreign affairs, security, and economic policy, we looked at the value gaps by the level of performance rating for the LDP (Figure 9).

At first glance, one can see a large gap in the indicators of positivity about the current situation as represented by the first three statements. It is often pointed out in similar surveys that views on whether society rewards those who work hard and positivity about the current state of society have a big impact on people supporting and voting for the ruling party, but naturally, we must consider the possibility of reverse causality. Even when people do not support the ruling party and keep voting for other parties, it does not effectuate regime change. Therefore, it is sufficiently possible that these responses are associated with the sentiment that Japan is not heading in the right direction and is not respected by the world. Furthermore, precisely because people do not give high performance ratings to the ruling party and are dissatisfied with the current administration, they may tend to think that society does not reward hard work. It is highly likely that performance ratings of political parties and positivity about the current state of society are correlated. Because of this, one must be aware of the danger of inferring reverse causality.




Figure 9 Values by party affiliation: General values

Meanwhile, the nature of the age gap is different. Because older people have more experience in the real world, they may have been rewarded for working hard, not to mention, they are the generation who were fortunate enough to have lived through Japan's period of rapid economic growth. Conversely, the younger generation is dissatisfied with the current working environment, and they may feel lost because they have not accumulated sufficient successful experiences or their income has not risen as high as that of the generation that lived during the economic boom. There is always a reason for the existence of age gaps like these.

However, even if this is the case, the strong feelings of negativity about the current situation among the group that gives the LDP very low performance ratings are notable, and this group's lack of support for the ruling party is not enough to explain these negative feelings.

Two important indicators that can be used to ascertain where this negativity about the current situation originates are feelings of unfairness and anti-establishment sentiment. People who disagree with the statement '(3) Japan is a fair society where

everyone who makes an effort can be rewarded' hold a strong feeling that society is unfair. This feeling manifests itself in the criticisms represented by the statements '(4) Elites in this country, including bureaucrats and politicians, do not understand the feeling of the people like me,' and '(6) Our economy system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Japanese and large corporations.'

That being said, the value gap between the groups that give the LDP very high and very low performance ratings shrinks when it comes to whether you should try to help yourself before relying on government programs. All four segments responded positively to this statement precisely because self-reliance is generally accepted value in Japanese society.

Finally, we can confirm that no major gaps by segment exist for statements (4), (5), (6), (8), (9), and (10). In this survey, wide-ranging anti-establishment sentiment and expectations for reform can be observed regardless of the performance rating that respondents give to the LDP, while the tendency to emphasize self-reliance is widespread. In other words, ruling party supporters do not blindly embrace the current situation; rather, some specific values have led them to conclude that there is no choice but to support a particular political party.

Besides, if regime change were to occur along the lines of value differences, at least two logically consistent packages of policy values would be necessary. Therefore, in the next section, we will analyze the survey results from the perspective of political value packages in terms of how the Japanese values observed in this survey are distributed.

3-6 Distribution of Japanese Values

As with the Voter Survey (Democracy Fund, Voter Study Group) in the U.S. that we introduced in the beginning of this report, the signature analysis is the one that combines economic and social values. Using the numerical point scores for the values in each of these areas, which we have already introduced, let's look at the distributions for each political value package. First, we plotted the value scores for social policy (y-axis) and economic policy (x-axis) for each respondent (n=2,060). Next, instead of plotting age-adjusted scores, we wrote the age-adjusted percentages of people in each quadrant. The definitions for each quadrant are as follows.

Conservative: Conservative in terms of both economic and social values
 Liberal: Liberal in terms of both economic and social values
 Libertarian: Conservative in terms of economic values but liberal in terms of social values
 Populist: Liberal in terms of economic values but conservative in terms of social values




Figure 10 Distribution of values pertaining to economic and social policies combined (All respondents)

At first glance, a very well-balanced distribution of respondents' values can be observed. This is clearly different from the results of the U.S. Voter Survey where most liberal respondents are clustered in the leftmost part of the graph, and libertarians are very limited in number (Conservative; 22.7%, Liberal; 44.6%, Libertarian; 3.8%, Populist; 28.9%).

So, why are these results spread throughout the four quadrants without much bias? What is evident at first glance is that the values of an extremely large number of Japanese people cluster in the center. Japanese people are often considered moderate, and while that may be the case, there must be other reasons for this trend. The wide variety of questions that surveys like this one pose—for instance, questions that run the gamut from nuclear power, traditional culture, and women's issues to correcting disparity, fiscal discipline, and public spending on education—do not constitute packages of values, and this raises a question. To what extent are votes for political parties divided based on values? Figure 11 shows the distribution of values pertaining to both economic and social policies based on the party for whom respondents voted in the proportional representation block in the House of Councillors election in 2019. The graph on the left plots only those respondents who voted for the LDP, while the graph on the right includes respondents who voted for the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). Although the Komeito belongs to the ruling bloc and there are many other opposition parties, for the sake of clarity, we only compared the LDP to the largest opposition party.




Figure 11 Distribution of values of LDP and CDP voters in the 2019 House of Councillors

election proportional representation block (Economic + Social)

Respondents who voted for the LDP are indicated in red, while those who voted for the CDP are indicated in blue. Although the LDP tends to promote socially conservative policies, as the graph on the left shows, values pertaining to social policy are balanced evenly between the conservative and liberal ends of the spectrum. With regard to values pertaining to economic policy, however, the party attracts a large number of realist-leaning voters. As the graph on the right shows, many of the respondents who voted for the CDP hold center-liberal values pertaining to social policy, but the party also attracts a considerable number of voters with socially conservative values. Unlike the Democratic Party in the United States, the party is not necessarily supported by voters who have largely abandoned economic populism.

As Figure 11 shows, the CDP is not effectively winning the socially liberal vote in elections. It is not possible to explain the voting behavior in the 2019 House of Councillors election proportional representation block by value gaps pertaining to economic policy and social policy. As we have observed in the survey results thus far, the reason for this is that the biggest factor influencing voting behavior exists in the shadows of economic and social issues—namely, values pertaining to foreign affairs, security, and the Constitution. Figure 12 shows the distribution of values pertaining to both economic policy and policies on foreign affairs, security and the Constitution, based on the party for whom respondents voted in the proportional representation block in the House of Councillors election in 2019.

In Figure 12, we can observe an even clearer distinction. Compared to social policy, the differences in values pertaining to foreign affairs and security appear to have a bigger impact on voting. Many LDP voters lean toward realism on issues of foreign affairs and security, while many CDP voters lean toward liberalism. The pension system and the consumption tax were issues in the 2019 House of Councillors election, but as we have shown thus far, voter values do not differ much in most areas, so it is hard to ascertain differences in terms of policy preferences. The policies that respondents ostensibly claim to support do not always drive them to vote. This is because, first and foremost, peoples' values pertaining to security and the Constitution are divided, and this factors into their decision to vote for a particular party.




Figure 12 Distribution of values of Liberal Democratic Party and Constitutional Democratic Party voters in the 2019 House of Councillors election proportional representation block (Economic + Foreign Affairs/Security)

Although it is not as extreme as in the United States, social liberalism does exist to a sufficient degree in Japan. However, because values pertaining to security are deeply divided, the CDP and other opposition parties are not able to fully win the socially liberal vote (i.e., liberal and libertarian voters). Although the CDP secures a portion of the moderate realist vote on issues of foreign affairs and security, this appears to be due to the fact that, as the biggest opposition party, it is the primary recipient of votes from voters critical of the administration. In reality, the debate surrounding the Constitution and differences of opinion on foreign affairs, security, and the Constitutional issues are effectively driving voters with realist positions on security away from the major opposition parties.

Depending on how the major opposition parties' positions on the Constitution and security shift going forward, the possibility of regime change taking hold in Japan exists. They will be driven mainly by external factors, and it will be influenced by how the ongoing discussion of Constitutional reforms actually plays out. In any case, the adoption of single-seat constituencies in the House of Representatives election is heightening the importance and profile of political parties, and this could increasingly lead to a convergence of ideologies and values within each party.

3-7 Supporter Profiles for Each Party

One major feature of this survey is the segment analysis based on the performance rating for each political party. In this section, we would like to begin by confirming the profile of a LDP supporter. Various opinion polls conducted by media outlets to date have shown that the LDP has garnered strong support from the younger generation. However, we believe a survey that compares parties in terms of their performance ratings would generate results that closer reflect the actual situation in Japan where people generally tend not to support any party. Figure 13 shows the performance ratings for the LDP by age group, but one can see that there are no major differences between the ‘very high’ and the ‘very low’ groups. Overall, 8% of respondents gave a ‘very high’ rating to the LDP, followed by 28% who gave the party a ‘high’ rating, 21% who gave it a ‘low’ rating, and 16% who gave it a ‘very low’ rating. These results suggest that although the LDP's base is very small, a majority of respondents give the party favorable performance ratings.




Figure 13 Performance ratings for the LDP by respondent age group

So, what is the breakdown by factors other than age? Are the people who support the LDP just elites and permanent employees of big corporations? This is not the case. The divide between whether one supports or doesn't support the LDP does not

occur along the axes of income or education because the LDP is not a class-based party. Take a look at Figure 14. The percentage of permanent employees is the only attribute where slightly higher results can be seen among LDP supporters, but in terms of political party support, there is only a minor 8-point difference in this percentage between the ‘very high’ and the ‘very low’ performance rating groups. The biggest fault line for LDP support is not class, but the issues of the Constitution and security, as we have observed in the analysis of values thus far.




Figure 14 Performance ratings for the LDP by employment type, education, and annual income

On this point, one must not confuse the LDP’s core supporters (e.g., small and medium-sized business owners, various interest groups, and farmers) with voters who actually voted for the LDP. The political party that garners the most support in Japan nowadays is “unaffiliated,” so it is of critical importance to understand the behavior of

voters who are not part of a given political party's support machinery. The LDP's base, which rates the party's performance as 'very high,' is only 8%. If the party pursues a socially conservative policy in response to hesitant opposition, it runs the risk of alienating a large proportion of its supporters. As we have already observed in the segment analysis on social policy, not only are the people who support the LDP on social values not radical, they differ very little from other voters.

Figure 15 shows the distribution of value combinations (Economic + Foreign Affairs/Security and Economic + Social) for respondents who voted for major opposition parties. There are no strong divisions between LDP voters and respondents who voted for opposition parties. The only notable trend is the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)'s economic populism and liberal orientation on foreign affairs and security.




Figure 15 Distribution of values of major opposition party voters in the 2019 House of Councillors election (Economic + Foreign Affairs/Security; Economic + Social)

The Japan Innovation Party (Ishin) voters are very similar to the LDP voters, who has economic realism and realist orientation on foreign affairs and security. The Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) which was established in 2018 by the moderates from the Democratic Party (DP) which took office in 2009-2012. The CDP was also established by ex-DP politicians in 2017 just before the general election, due to the internal conflict in DP. The CDP has mostly left-leaning politicians in foreign affairs and security. Together, CDP and DPFP constitute 20% of the seats in the House of Representatives, while the LDP has 61% of the seats.

There are no parties that exhibit clear distinctions with the LDP on social policy. If anything can be said, the CDP and the JCP lean toward social liberalism, but they also garnered votes from socially conservative respondents, which reveals they are supported by two types of voters with differing values.

Reiwa gained dramatic attention in the 2019 House of Councillors election. Reiwa is the newest political party in Japan, and its voters have left leaning ideologies in economic policy. The Reiwa fever was understood as the first economic far-left populism observed in Japan, but the primary reason for that Reiwa gained more votes than expected, was the clarity of their arguments. For example, on the issue of the consumption tax, the party not only opposed the tax hike, it called for the abolishment of the tax altogether. It also championed “zero” nuclear power, placing its focus on issues that strike close to home with voters. However, even if the CDP were to campaign on promises focused more on redistribution like the Reiwa platform, it would end up alienating the broad base of voters who actually vote for the party, and it would likely face difficulties in expanding its influence. This can be seen in the distribution of values in Figure 15.

Reiwa only won two seats in the proportional representation block, but the party has some intriguing features. Considering the small number of people who voted for Reiwa, it would not be appropriate to conduct a statistical analysis, but the general trends among survey respondents who said they voted for Reiwa are as follows. First, the education level of Reiwa voters does not differ much from that of other voters, but when you look at income level, more than 40% said their personal annual income is one million yen or less while just under 70% said their income was three million yen or less. In terms of household income, very low income households (with annual incomes of 3 million yen or less) and upper-middle income households (with annual incomes of 7 - 10 million yen) each accounted for just under 30% of the Reiwa voters. Voters in these upper-middle income households tended to vote for the JCP in their electoral districts. In other words, we can hypothesize that respondents in upper-middle income households, who tend to choose a party to vote for based on ideology, voted for the seemingly more radical Reiwa in the proportional representation block.

On the other hand, voters in very low income households who voted for Reiwa Shinsengumi in the proportional representation block voted for various other parties in their electoral districts, notably the CDP and DPFP, but also to a lesser degree the JCP, the far-right Party to Protect the People from NHK (N-koku), and even the LDP, the

ruling party. While these respondents are generally left-leaning in their ideology, we cannot claim they are pure leftists because some of them voted for the right wing parties. It is possible that they base their support on the party's populist style rather than ideology.

Next, let's look at the values of Reiwa Shinsengumi voters. Reiwa Shinsengumi voters are typified by their economic populist-leaning values, and their positions on social policy and foreign affairs and security policies cannot be classified as strikingly liberal. For example, they sense imminent security threat from China, but their stance on Korea is slightly more conciliatory than the Japanese average. The majority of Reiwa supporters are for strengthening counterterrorism measures, and they are favorable to concluding alliances with Australia and Great Britain. In terms of security ideology, they favor protecting the Constitution but this is limited to opposition to the right to exercise collective self-defense and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.

There is another major feature of Reiwa voters, however. More than 70% of respondents who voted for Reiwa indicate a strong desire for reform, more than 80% want strong leadership, and more than 90% feel that Japan is heading in the wrong direction. These numbers are all much higher than the averages for all Japanese people.

To summarize, while Reiwa voters clearly hold left-wing Constitutional protectionist views on foreign affairs and security policies, but these are not the core values of party supporters. Rather, what is noticeable is how these voters can be characterized by the intensity of their views—namely, their negativity about the current situation, their desire to break up vested interests, and their longing for strong leadership that can break up vested interests. Looking at voting behaviors in the electoral districts, it appears that Reiwa took votes away from the CDP and the JCP in the 2019 House of Councillors election. The driving forces behind this were distrust in politics, the media, and elite society, a critical stance against the establishment, and economic populist-leaning values.

Conclusion

What this survey revealed is that the values of respondents pertaining to economic policy and social policy are extremely balanced. In addition, value gaps by party affiliation were concentrated in abstract value notions pertaining to the Constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security alliance. As for social policy, there is an observable generation gap, and Japanese people as a whole, while they remain moderate, are gradually becoming more liberal. Meanwhile, values pertaining to women's issues tended to be moderately liberal, and surprisingly, there were almost no gaps by party affiliation and age. In order to understand this phenomenon, we have to look at some changes brought into the society in recent years. Abe administration introduced policies to empower women in 2013. This policy was called 'Womanomics,' and played an important role in changing society, because many people including conservatives were convinced by the economic impact of introducing more women into the labor market. After the #MeToo movement began in the United States in 2017, Japanese mass media continuously broadcasted this issue. In 2018, there was a heated debate over sexual harassment by then Undersecretary of Finance. Although many have pointed out that there scarcely is loud protest or demonstration on women's issues in Japan, society undergoes definite changes through gradual shift in social norms.

Similar phenomenon can be observed concerning views on the intake of foreigners. The conservative government presented a policy for the expanded intake of foreign workers in 2018. Throughout the process of this law reform, the issue of foreign workers is treated as an important part of the economic growth strategy. In our survey, respondents tended to hold liberal views on the intake of foreigners regardless of party affiliation.

Because these results cannot be compared to past surveys, we cannot prove that Japan has become more liberal in recent years on issues pertaining to women and foreigners, but we can confirm that conservatives of all ages now clearly hold liberal values with regard to women's issues.

Socially liberal policies have not been central to the platforms of opposition parties because foreign affairs and security have become the major dividing factors in Japan. However, the CDP, the largest opposition party, has shifted tack to a more liberal direction in social policy. On the other hand, Reiwa has put forth a bold redistribution-

oriented policy package. Whether this will lead to a division of values pertaining to economic and social policies along partisan lines is the subject of a future survey. Meanwhile, the LDP is beginning to understand the importance of social policy. As observed with the policy to empower women, the LDP is expanding its wings to cover libertarians; socially liberal but economically realistic voters. As long as the LDP successfully includes this segment, Japan is likely to remain divided on foreign affairs and security policy.

This survey shows that respondents are generally moderate and that, with a sustained approach, public opinion can be shifted on economic and social policies and issues of security other than the symbolic Japan-U.S. alliance and the Constitution. The conservative-leaning value gap on foreign affairs and security combined with the moderateness of Japanese values pertaining to economic and social policies may be the reason why Japan continues to maintain its peculiar stability when compared to other developed countries.

List of survey responses

Table 1 **Gender**

SEX	Single answer	(%)
1	Male	48.5
2	Female	51.5
	Total (N)	2060

Table 2 **Age**

AGEID	Single answer	(%)
1	Under 12 years	0.0
2	12 – 19 years	10.0
3	20 – 24 years	4.9
4	25 – 29 years	10.1
5	30 – 34 years	7.3
6	35 – 39 years	7.7
7	40 – 44 years	6.9
8	45 – 49 years	8.1
9	50 – 54 years	7.9
10	55 – 59 years	7.1
11	60 years and above	30.0
	Total (N)	2060

Table 3 **Prefecture**

PREFECTURE	Single answer	(%)
1	Hokkaido	5.0
2	Aomori	0.9

3	Iwate	0.5
4	Miyagi	2.1
5	Akita	0.6
6	Yamagata	0.6
7	Fukushima	0.9
8	Ibaraki	1.5
9	Tochigi	1.3
10	Gunma	1.4
11	Saitama	4.9
12	Chiba	5.4
13	Tokyo	13.5
14	Kanagawa	7.4
15	Niigata	1.6
16	Toyama	0.9
17	Ishikawa	0.9
18	Fukui	0.5
19	Yamanashi	0.4
20	Nagano	1.2
21	Gifu	1.4
22	Shizuoka	2.2
23	Aichi	6.6
24	Mie	1.4
25	Shiga	1.2
26	Kyoto	2.3

27	Osaka	8.7
28	Hyogo	5.7
29	Nara	1.1
30	Wakayama	0.9
31	Tottori	0.4
32	Shimane	0.5
33	Okayama	1.4
34	Hiroshima	1.8
35	Yamaguchi	0.4
36	Tokushima	0.7
37	Kagawa	0.8
38	Ehime	1.0
39	Kochi	0.4
40	Fukuoka	4.4
41	Saga	0.4
42	Nagasaki	0.8
43	Kumamoto	1.2
44	Oita	0.6
45	Miyazaki	0.7
46	Kagoshima	0.9
47	Okinawa	0.5
	Total (N)	2060

Table 4 **Geographical Region**

AREA	Single answer	(%)
1	Hokkaido	5.0
2	Tohoku	5.6
3	Kanto	35.3
4	Chubu	17.0
5	Kinki	20.0
6	Chugoku	4.6
7	Shikoku	3.0
8	Kyushu	9.5
	Total (N)	2060

Table 5 Marriage Status

MARRIED	Single answer	(%)
1	Single	40.4
2	Married	59.6
	Total (N)	2060

Table 6 Children

CHILD	Single answer	(%)
1	No	44.1
2	Yes	55.9
	Total (N)	2060

Table 7 Household Income

HINCOME	Single answer	(%)
1	Less than 2 million yen	7.5
2	2 – 3.99 million yen	21.4
3	4 – 5.99 million yen	19.3
4	6 – 7.99 million yen	12.5
5	6 – 7.99 million yen	6.7
6	10 – 11.99 million yen	3.5
7	12 – 14.99 million yen	2.0
8	15 – 19.99 million yen	1.2
9	20 million yen or more	0.6
10	I don't know	12.0
	No answer	13.3
	Total (N)	2060

Table 8 Personal Income

PINCOME	Single answer	(%)
1	Less than 2 million yen	33.7
2	2 – 3.99 million yen	25.1
3	4 – 5.99 million yen	11.4
4	6 – 7.99 million yen	4.4
5	8 – 9.99 million	2.4
6	10 – 11.99 million yen	1.3
7	12 – 14.99 million yen	0.4
8	15 – 19.99 million yen	0.3

9	20 million yen or more	0.2
10	I don't know	7.9
	No answer	12.8
	Total (N)	2060

Table 9 Occupation

JOB	Single answer	(%)
1	Government employee	3.1
2	Company owner or executive	1.5
3	Company employee (Administrative)	10.6
4	Company employee (Technical)	8.2
5	Company employee (Other)	11.8
6	Sole proprietor	5.9
7	Freelancer	1.0
8	Full-time homemaker	16.1
9	Part-time or casual worker	12.4
10	Student	10.7
11	Other	3.5
12	Unemployed	15.2
	Total (N)	2060

Table 10 Student Type

	Single answer	(%)
1	Elementary school	0.0

2	Junior high school student	0.0
3	High school / technical high school student	24.4
4	Technical college student	7.2
5	Junior college student	4.1
6	University student	61.1
7	Graduate school student	2.3
8	Other student	0.9
	Total (N)	221

Table 11 **Assignment Cell**

CELL	Single answer	(%)
1	18 – 19 years / Nationwide	10.0
2	20 – 29 years / Nationwide	15.0
3	30 – 39 years / Nationwide	15.0
4	40 – 49 years / Nationwide	15.0
5	50 – 59 years / Nationwide	15.0
6	60 – 69 years / Nationwide	15.0
7	70 years and above / Nationwide	15.0
	Total (N)	2060

Table 12

Q2	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	
	Single answer	(%)
1	Junior high school	5.5

2	High school	33.1
3	Junior college or technical junior college	21.0
4	Four-year university	36.1
5	Graduate school	3.7
6	Other ()	0.6
	Total (N)	2060

Table 13

Q3	<p>Please choose the response that applies to you regarding your current employment.</p> <p>* If multiple items apply, please choose the primary one.</p> <p>Single answer</p>	(%)
1	Permanent employee	30.7
2	Contract employee	4.9
3	Temporary employee	2.3
4	Part-time or casual worker	14.1
5	Full-time homemaker	15.2
6	Pensioner	5.9
7	Student	10.1
8	Other ()	5.1
9	Unemployed	11.6
	Total (N)	2060

Table 14

Q4	Please choose the response that applies to you regarding your personal annual income. * Please indicate your annual income before tax.		Single answer	(%)
1	1 million yen or less			35.3
2	1.01 – 3 million yen			28.8
3	3.01 – 5 million yen			21.4
4	5.01 – 7 million yen			7.6
5	7.01 – 10 million yen			4.8
6	10.01 million yen or more			2.1
	Total (N)			2060

Table 15

Q5	Please choose the response that applies to you regarding your household's annual income. * Please indicate your annual income before tax.		Single answer	(%)
1	1 million yen or less			7.5
2	1.01 – 3 million yen			17.1
3	3.01 – 5 million yen			29.4
4	5.01 – 7 million yen			20.8
5	7.01 – 10 million yen			15.7
6	10.01 – 15 million yen			7.2
7	15.01 million yen or more			2.3
	Total (N)			2060

Table 16

Q6	Please choose the response that applies to you the most regarding the outlook for your household's annual income.		Single answer	(%)
1		I think it will increase significantly		2.4
2		I think it will increase slightly		17.8
3		I don't think it will change		37.9
4		I think it will decrease slightly		22.6
5		I think it will decrease significantly		10.1
6		I don't know		9.1
		Total (N)		2060

Table 17

Q7	Please choose the responses that apply to you regarding your daily media consumption.	1	2	3	4	5	6
		I use it every day	I use it almost every day	I use it regularly but not every day	I use it to some degree but not regularly	I almost never use it	I never use it (%)
1	Television	64.7	19.2	5.4	3.5	3.5	3.6
2	Radio	8.4	7.5	8.1	10.8	25.6	39.5
3	Newspapers	29.7	8.4	4.9	5.9	15.1	36.0
4	Magazines	0.7	1.5	9.8	21.7	37.2	29.1

5	Online content (excluding personal blogs)	41.5	24.4	12.8	10.5	6.0	4.9
6	Personal blogs	5.6	6.1	11.5	15.7	25.2	35.9

The following data has been age-adjusted using the weighting factors.

Table 18

Q8	This is a question about voting in elections. Please choose the response that applies to you.	
	Single answer	(%)
1	I always vote	42.2
2	I try to vote as much as possible	31.3
3	I do not usually vote	13.8
4	I never vote	12.7
	Total (N)	2060

Table 19

Q9: This is a question about the House of Councillors election in July. Please choose the responses that apply to you for each item.

Q9	Single answer	Total (N)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
			LDP	CDP	Komeito	Ishin	JCP	DPFP	Reiwa	SDP	N-koku	Other	I did not vote	I don't remember	I don't want to answer (%)
1	Voted in the electoral district	2060	25.1	11.4	3.5	5.9	4.5	1.7	1.5	0.4	1.9	1.8	20.9	6.1	15.3
2	Voted in the proportional representation block	2060	21.5	10.3	3.6	7.9	4.2	1.5	3.6	0.7	2.4	1.7	21.4	6.2	15.0

Table 20

Q10: Which party did you vote for in the proportional representation block in the House of Representatives election in 2017?

Q10	Single answer	Total (N)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
			LDP	CDP	Party of Hope	Komeito	JCP	Ishin	Liberal Party	SDP	Party for Japanese Kokoro	Other	I did not vote	I don't remember	I don't want to answer (%)
1	Voted in the electoral district	1854	26.5	10.8	0.8	3.2	4.5	5.5	0.2	0.6	0.1	1.7	19.4	13.6	13.2
2	Voted in the proportional representation block	1854	23.2	10.5	0.7	3.6	5.2	7.6	0.3	1.0	0.3	1.8	19.5	13.3	13.1

Table 20

Q11: This is a question about foreign affairs and security. Please choose the response that best reflects your views for each statement.

		1	2	3	4	5
		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
Single answer		(%)				
S1	We should further strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.	11.0	38.6	27.0	6.8	16.5
S2	The government should increase defense spending in the near future.	9.3	28.3	32.5	14.7	15.2
S3	I think China has territorial ambitions.	47.8	31.9	7.6	2.9	9.8
S4	Japan should seek to possess nuclear weapons in the future.	4.7	10.4	24.1	50.1	10.8
S5	Japan should not compromise with South Korea on history issues.	46.7	29.1	10.6	3.7	9.9
S6	I am in favor of the Constitutional revision plan that stipulates the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), while maintaining Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9.	13.7	30.8	19.2	17.7	18.6
S7	I agree with the 2015 security law reform which enabled partially exercise the right to collective self-defense.	12.1	33.0	24.1	13.2	17.7
S8	The Self-Defense Forces should be actively used to contribute to international society.	11.9	36.8	26.6	9.4	15.3

S9	The government should enhance surveillance to strengthen counterterrorism measures.	19.7	50.0	15.6	4.4	10.2
S10	Japan should conclude alliances with like-minded countries such as UK, Australia.	14.6	43.6	18.3	3.2	20.2

Table 21

Q12: This is a question about economic issues. Please choose the response that best reflects your views for each statement.

		1	2	3	4	5
		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
Single answer		(%)				
S1	Economic growth is important even if it generates some disparity.	7.0	40.3	30.3	9.7	12.7
S2	I agree with the decision to raise the consumption tax to 10%.	5.8	22.0	27.9	34.8	9.4
S3	Japan should further reduce the number of public works projects.	9.7	27.4	37.7	8.6	16.5
S4	Rising stock prices are a good thing.	14.5	49.3	15.7	3.4	17.1
S5	Things that the private sector can do should be left to the private sector.	20.9	53.7	13.7	2.9	8.8

S6	Japan should not raise the tax rate on high income earners any further.	5.0	12.9	32.4	39.6	10.1
S7	If Japan plans to expand human services any further, it should raise taxes.	7.5	31.3	33.2	16.0	12.0
S8	The corporate tax should not be raised any higher.	6.1	19.8	34.5	22.7	16.8
S9	I approve of free trade.	15.4	49.0	15.2	3.3	17.1
S10	No more budget should be spent on poverty programs such as 'livelihood protection.'	14.3	25.6	31.4	14.4	14.3

Table 22

Q13: This is a question about social issues. Please choose the response that best reflects your views for each statement.

		1	2	3	4	5	
		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know	
Single answer							(%)
S1	I oppose allowing husbands and wives to have different surnames.	9.7	16.4	36.5	26.3	11.2	

S2	Homosexuals should not be given special treatment.	18.2	43.8	17.5	8.3	12.3
S3	More importance should be placed on Japan's traditional events.	24.4	53.4	13.3	2.8	6.1
S4	Nuclear power plants should be maintained for the time being.	8.6	29.8	24.0	24.6	12.9
S5	The government should not expand acceptance of foreign workers.	10.7	23.7	39.9	14.8	10.9
S6	I do not want foreign tourists to be increased anymore.	7.8	19.0	41.0	22.3	10.0
S7	I oppose adopting a quota on the percentage of female of Diet members.	6.7	20.5	38.0	21.6	13.1
S8	Some corporal punishment as a form of parental discipline is unavoidable.	6.9	34.3	28.7	21.0	9.1
S9	The overconcentration of resources in Tokyo should be corrected even if it means using the national budget.	17.9	38.6	21.9	6.4	15.3
S10	University tuition should not be made completely free.	20.7	37.5	20.8	11.7	9.4

Table 23

Q14: This is a question about women’s issues. Please choose the response that best reflects your views for each statement.

Single answer		1	2	3	4	5	(%)
		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don’t know	
S1	Women are better suited to housework.	3.2	27.5	36.7	17.5		15.0
S2	When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors.	7.3	26.9	42.0	11.9		12.0
S3	Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.	13.4	50.8	24.4	3.9		7.4
S4	Women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve.	5.8	37.4	34.1	7.6		15.1
S5	Sexual harassment against women in the workplace is no longer a problem in Japan.	0.6	4.5	36.4	53.1		5.4
S6	Increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in Japan.	8.6	45.8	26.3	5.4		13.9

Table 24

Q15: This is a question about Japanese society. Please choose the response that best reflects your views for each statement.

		1	2	3	4	5
		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
Single answer		(%)				
S1	I think Japan today is heading in the right direction.	2.7	20.0	41.6	19.5	16.2
S2	Japan is a country respected by the world.	3.7	34.5	38.2	9.8	13.8
S3	Japan is a fair society where everyone who makes an effort can be rewarded.	4.9	37.1	35.1	13.4	9.4
S4	Elites in this country, including bureaucrats and politicians, do not understand the feeling of the people like me.	40.2	41.2	10.1	2.1	6.5
S5	You can't believe much of what you hear from the mainstream media.	25.8	41.7	19.9	2.6	10.0
S6	Our economy system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Japanese and large corporations.	33.3	45.8	11.3	2.4	7.1
S7	Elections today don't matter; things stay the same no matter who we vote in.	18.0	38.4	28.1	10.1	5.5

S8	Reforms are necessary even if they result in short-term destabilization.	12.3	47.9	22.2	4.0	13.6
S9	Japan needs strong leaders to break up vested interests.	19.5	40.8	22.1	4.3	13.2
S10	Generally speaking, it is important to try to help yourself before relying on government programs.	16.3	57.7	13.4	3.2	9.4

Table 25

Q16: This is a question about Japanese political parties Please choose the response that best reflects your views for each political party.

		1	2	3	4	5
	Single answer	I give them a very high performance rating	I give them a high performance rating	I give them a low performance rating	I give them a very low performance rating	Neutral / I don't know (%)
1	Liberal Democratic Party	7.2	36.9	20.0	15.1	20.7
2	Constitutional Democratic Party	2.0	20.9	27.7	22.7	26.7
3	Komeito	1.8	17.3	28.8	26.4	25.7
4	Japan Innovation Party	3.6	24.8	26.5	18.0	27.2
5	Japanese Communist Party	2.7	16.3	25.0	29.7	26.3
6	Democratic Party for the People	0.6	11.6	31.1	26.3	30.3
7	Reiwa Shinsengumi	3.7	13.0	20.6	32.4	30.3
8	Social Democratic Party	0.8	8.7	24.3	34.8	31.4
9	The Party to Protect the People from NHK	3.6	11.4	17.8	44.9	22.3

■ Appendices ■

Q15 (Questions on general values): Distribution of responses by age group

Q15S1	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
18 – 19 years	2.9%	13.1%	42.2%	19.4%	22.3%
20 – 29 years	2.3%	12.3%	37.9%	25.2%	22.3%
30 – 39 years	2.6%	15.2%	39.5%	17.5%	25.2%
40 – 49 years	2.3%	15.5%	41.7%	19.7%	20.7%
50 – 59 years	4.5%	20.4%	39.5%	20.1%	15.5%
60 – 69 years	2.9%	23.9%	44.7%	16.8%	11.7%
70 years and above	1.9%	27.5%	43.7%	19.4%	7.4%
Total	2.8%	18.5%	41.3%	19.8%	17.7%
Q15S2					
18 – 19 years	3.9%	35.9%	29.6%	13.1%	17.5%
20 – 29 years	7.1%	30.7%	37.5%	10.7%	13.9%
30 – 39 years	3.6%	25.9%	36.2%	12.9%	21.4%
40 – 49 years	2.3%	27.8%	42.4%	11.7%	15.9%
50 – 59 years	5.2%	32.7%	34.0%	9.4%	18.8%
60 – 69 years	2.9%	38.5%	39.5%	8.4%	10.7%
70 years and above	2.6%	44.7%	39.2%	7.1%	6.5%
Total	3.9%	33.6%	37.3%	10.3%	14.8%
Q15S3					
18 – 19 years	3.9%	30.1%	33.5%	15.5%	17.0%

20 – 29 years	8.1%	24.6%	29.8%	20.7%	16.8%
30 – 39 years	6.1%	30.7%	31.4%	19.4%	12.3%
40 – 49 years	6.1%	29.4%	37.9%	15.2%	11.3%
50 – 59 years	3.9%	35.3%	37.2%	13.6%	10.0%
60 – 69 years	3.9%	42.7%	37.2%	10.4%	5.8%
70 years and above	3.2%	50.8%	35.3%	6.8%	3.9%
Total	5.1%	35.0%	34.7%	14.5%	10.7%

Q15S4	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
18 – 19 years	31.1%	35.4%	14.6%	2.4%	16.5%
20 – 29 years	37.2%	37.2%	11.7%	3.9%	10.0%
30 – 39 years	40.8%	36.9%	10.4%	3.2%	8.7%
40 – 49 years	39.5%	39.5%	11.3%	1.3%	8.4%
50 – 59 years	42.7%	39.2%	9.4%	2.3%	6.5%
60 – 69 years	38.8%	46.9%	8.7%	1.0%	4.5%
70 years and above	42.1%	44.7%	9.1%	1.6%	2.6%
Total	39.3%	40.2%	10.5%	2.2%	7.8%

Q15S5	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
18 – 19 years	38.8%	33.0%	14.1%	1.9%	12.1%
20 – 29 years	29.4%	41.4%	13.3%	4.5%	11.3%
30 – 39 years	26.9%	46.0%	14.6%	2.3%	10.4%
40 – 49 years	24.9%	41.7%	19.1%	2.3%	12.0%
50 – 59 years	28.2%	35.6%	21.7%	2.6%	12.0%
60 – 69 years	23.3%	43.0%	24.9%	1.9%	6.8%

70 years and above	23.0%	43.0%	23.0%	2.6%	8.4%
Total	27.2%	40.9%	18.9%	2.6%	10.3%

Q15S6

18 – 19 years	22.3%	42.7%	12.1%	2.9%	19.9%
20 – 29 years	26.9%	41.7%	12.0%	6.5%	12.9%
30 – 39 years	26.2%	42.4%	15.2%	4.9%	11.3%
40 – 49 years	31.4%	43.7%	14.9%	1.9%	8.1%
50 – 59 years	38.8%	44.7%	8.4%	2.3%	5.8%
60 – 69 years	36.2%	49.8%	10.0%	0.6%	3.2%
70 years and above	37.9%	49.5%	8.7%	0.6%	3.2%
Total	31.8%	45.0%	11.6%	2.8%	8.7%

Q15S7

18 – 19 years	16.5%	37.4%	26.7%	9.2%	10.2%
20 – 29 years	31.1%	34.0%	20.7%	8.1%	6.1%
30 – 39 years	23.0%	43.0%	17.8%	8.4%	7.8%
40 – 49 years	20.1%	39.2%	24.9%	9.1%	6.8%
50 – 59 years	16.5%	39.8%	27.5%	10.7%	5.5%
60 – 69 years	13.3%	38.5%	31.4%	11.7%	5.2%
70 years and above	11.3%	36.2%	38.5%	11.3%	2.6%
Total	18.9%	38.3%	26.8%	9.8%	6.1%

Q15S8	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
18 – 19 years	9.7%	32.5%	22.8%	5.3%	29.6%
20 – 29 years	13.3%	36.9%	23.9%	4.2%	21.7%

30 – 39 years	8.1%	37.2%	25.2%	6.8%	22.7%
40 – 49 years	9.7%	50.8%	22.7%	2.6%	14.2%
50 – 59 years	12.9%	50.5%	18.8%	3.9%	13.9%
60 – 69 years	12.0%	54.4%	23.3%	2.9%	7.4%
70 years and above	16.2%	53.1%	20.4%	3.9%	6.5%
Total	11.8%	45.7%	22.4%	4.2%	15.9%

Q15S9

18 – 19 years	13.6%	27.7%	22.8%	4.4%	31.6%
20 – 29 years	19.7%	28.5%	25.6%	5.8%	20.4%
30 – 39 years	13.6%	34.0%	25.2%	6.1%	21.0%
40 – 49 years	18.4%	41.1%	20.7%	4.2%	15.5%
50 – 59 years	24.3%	41.4%	21.7%	2.3%	10.4%
60 – 69 years	18.1%	50.5%	20.1%	3.2%	8.1%
70 years and above	22.3%	45.0%	21.4%	4.5%	6.8%
Total	18.8%	38.8%	22.5%	4.4%	15.5%

Q15S10

18 – 19 years	17.0%	39.3%	17.0%	4.4%	22.3%
20 – 29 years	16.5%	49.5%	14.6%	3.9%	15.5%
30 – 39 years	14.6%	48.2%	16.2%	4.2%	16.8%
40 – 49 years	17.8%	56.0%	11.3%	4.5%	10.4%
50 – 59 years	18.4%	55.3%	12.0%	3.2%	11.0%
60 – 69 years	12.6%	64.4%	16.5%	1.3%	5.2%
70 years and above	17.2%	67.3%	11.0%	2.6%	1.9%
Total	16.3%	55.0%	13.9%	3.4%	11.4%

Breakdown of segments by their performance rating of the LDP

PERFORMANCE RATING OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

	Very high performance rating	High performanc e rating	Low performanc e rating	Very low performance rating
18 – 19 YEARS	2%	2%	1%	2%
20 – 29 YEARS	7%	8%	10%	7%
30 – 39 YEARS	11%	14%	12%	8%
40 – 49 YEARS	21%	19%	16%	16%
50 – 59 YEARS	16%	16%	14%	14%
60 – 69 YEARS	15%	19%	17%	22%
70 YEARS AND ABOVE	29%	23%	31%	31%
	Very high performance rating	High performanc e rating	Low performanc e rating	Very low performance rating
PERMANENT EMPLOYEE	34%	35%	30%	26%
CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	4%	5%	4%	7%
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEE	3%	2%	2%	3%
PART-TIME OR CASUAL WORKER	8%	13%	14%	13%
FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER	13%	14%	15%	13%
PENSIONER	7%	5%	8%	11%

STUDENT	7%	8%	8%	8%
OTHER (FREELANCER ETC.)	7%	6%	6%	4%
UNEMPLOYED	17%	11%	13%	15%
ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME	Very high performance rating	High performance rating	Low performance rating	Very low performance rating
1 MILLION YEN OR LESS	9%	5%	4%	12%
1.01 – 3 MILLION YEN	15%	15%	17%	22%
3.01 – 5 MILLION YEN	28%	29%	33%	30%
5.01 – 7 MILLION YEN	14%	22%	22%	15%
7.01 – 10 MILLION YEN	21%	18%	16%	12%
10.01 – 15 MILLION YEN	7%	9%	7%	7%
15.01 MILLION YEN OR MORE	5%	3%	2%	2%
ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME OUTLOOK	Very high performance rating	High performance rating	Low performance rating	Very low performance rating
I THINK IT WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY.	4%	2%	2%	3%
I THINK IT WILL INCREASE SLIGHTLY.	19%	20%	15%	11%
I DON'T THINK IT WILL CHANGE	34%	39%	37%	35%
I THINK IT WILL DECREASE SLIGHTLY.	29%	24%	29%	24%
I THINK IT WILL DECREASE SIGNIFICANTLY.	7%	9%	11%	18%

DON'T KNOW	7%	5%	6%	9%
Q2	Very high performance rating	High performance rating	Low performance rating	Very low performance rating
JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL	9%	4%	3%	4%
HIGH SCHOOL	34%	32%	32%	34%
JUNIOR COLLEGE OR TECHNICAL JUNIOR COLLEGE	13%	21%	23%	19%
FOUR-YEAR UNIVERSITY	38%	39%	40%	39%
GRADUATE SCHOOL	7%	4%	3%	4%

INQUIRIES

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